Washington Supreme Court Upholds State Anti-Spamming Law by Oman, Nathan B.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2002
Washington Supreme Court Upholds State Anti-
Spamming Law
Nathan B. Oman
William & Mary Law School, nboman@wm.edu
Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Oman, Nathan B., "Washington Supreme Court Upholds State Anti-Spamming Law" (2002). Faculty Publications. Paper 535.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/535
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE -
WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS STATE ANTI-
SPAMMING LAW.- Washington v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001), 
cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3193 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2001) (No. 01-469). 
The Internet has introduced Americans to a host of new terms1 and 
given new meanings to some old words. 2 Originally a lunch meat, the 
lexicographers of cyberspace have adopted the word "spam" to refer to 
unwanted commercial email messages. 3 In 1999, Washington state 
adopted legislation designed to regulate spam,4 joining seventeen other 
states that have passed similar laws.5 In State v. Heckel, 6 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that Washington's law did not violate the 
dormant comm~rce clause. 7 The court's analysis sidestepped the ma-
jor question presented by the case and allowed the court to avoid 
weighing the cost of potentially unconstitutional legislation by simply 
attaching a negative label to a burdened activity. Other courts grap-
pling with dormant commerce clause challenges to state Internet regu-
lations should not follow the Heckel court's analysis. 
The Washington law makes it illegal to send two categories of mes-
sages from an email account within the state or to "an electronic mail 
address that the sender knows, or has reason to know, is held by a 
Washington resident. "8 The first is a message that masks the identity 
of the sender.9 The second is a message that "[c]ontains false or mis-
leading information in the subject line."10 Jason Heckel, an Oregon 
resident who sent 1oo,ooo to 1,ooo,ooo spam messages each week sell-
I Email, download, website, hacker, domain name, gif, peri, and web address, to name just a 
few. 
2 Flame, browse, cookie, buffer, and virus, for example. 
3 See Washington v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 406 n.1 (Wash. 2001) (discussing the history of the 
term "spam"). 
4 See WASH. REV. CODE§§ 19-I90.005-I9.I90.0JO (1999). 
S See http://www.spamlaws.com/state/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2001). 
6 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3193 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2001) (No. 01-469). 
7 I d. at 406. The dormant commerce clause refers to a body of judge-made Jaw that has been 
inferred from the "great silences of the Constitution." H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 
U.S. 525, 535 (1949) Oackson, J.). Since its 1852 decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 
(12 How.) 299 (1852), the Supreme Court has held that certain kinds of state regulation violate the 
Constitution because they impinge on the congressional prerogative to regulate interstate com-
merce. The Court has generally struck down state laws that on their face discriminate against out 
of state business. In addition, the Court has held that the negative effects of nondiscriminatory 
state regulation on commerce occurring outside the state may sometimes violate the constitution. 
See generally I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, at 1029-43 
(3d ed. 2ooo). 
8 WASH. REV. CODE. § I9.190.o20(I). Violations of the prohibitions are made a violation of 
the Washington Consumer Protection Act. I d. § I9.I90.030. Under the act, a violator can be sued 
for treble damages in a private suit, id. § 19.86.090, and be fined up to $2oo,ooo, id. § 19.86.140. 
9 Id. §§ I9.190.020(I)(a), 19.190.0JO(I)(a). 
10 Id. §§ I9.I90.020(l)(b), l9.190.0JO(I)(b). 
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ing an online booklet entitled "How to Profit from the Internet," be-
came the first person prosecuted under the law. 11 Generally, email 
messages contain a "return path" identifying the sender, but Heckel al-
tered this information. Some Washington recipients of Heckel's mes-
sages complained to the Washington Attorney General's office. 12 After 
Heckel ignored an initial request by the State Attorney General's office 
to stop, the State filed suit, alleging violations of its anti-spamming 
law.13 
Heckel moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Washing-
ton anti-spamming law violated the dormant commerce clause, and 
the state cross-filed for summary judgment. 14 On March ro, 2ooo, Su-
perior Court Judge Palmer issued a terse, handwritten, 15 one-page 
opinion. 16 He concluded that "the statute in question here violates the 
Federal Interstate Commerce Clause of the united states [sic] Constitu-
tion" because it "is unduly restrictive and burdensome."17 The state 
then petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for direct review. 18 
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Owen rejected the lower 
court's decision and held that the law did not run afoul of the dormant 
commerce clause.19 The court took a two-step approach to its consti-
tutional analysis, looking first to whether the statute discriminated on 
its face against non-Washington residents. Finding that it did not,20 
11 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 406; see also Spamming and Spoofing: Washington v. Jason Heckel d/b/a 
Natural Instincts, at http://www.netlitigation.com/netlitigation/cases/heckelcase.htm (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2001). 
12 See Heckel, 24 P.3d at 406--o7. 
!3 ld. at 407. The state also contended that Heckel violated the Consumer Protection Act by 
failing to provide a usable return email address. ld.; see also WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020 
(prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce"). 
Heckel's practice was to open anonymous email accounts with free services such as Juno or Hot-
mail. He would then send spam messages from these accounts. When the accounts became del-
uged with angry responses, Heckel would simply open a new account. See Heckel, 24 P.3d at 
407--o8. This practice is not specifically forbidden by the state anti-spamming law, but the Attor-
ney General argued that it constituted a deceptive practice in violation of the Consumer Protec-
tion Act. See id. at 408. The lower court's opinion addressed neither the constitutionality nor the 
merits of this theory, and the Washington Supreme Court did not discuss it. See State v. Heckel, 
No. 98-2-25480-7 SEA, 2000 WL 979720, at *1 (Wash. Super. Mar. 10, 2000); see also Heckel, 24 
P.3d at 413. 
14 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 408. 
15 Max P. Ochoa, Legislative Note: Recent State Laws Regulating Unsolicited Electronic Mail, 
16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 459, 469 (2000). 
16 Heckel, 2ooci WL 979720. 
17 /d. at*I. 
18 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 406. 
19 /d. at 413. 
20 /d. at 409 ("The Act applies evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state spammers: 'No per-
son' may transmit the proscribed commercial e-mail messages .... Thus, just as the statute ap-
plied to Heckel, an Oregon resident, it is enforceable against a Washington business engaging in 
the same practices." (citation omitted)). 
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the court applied the balancing analysis required under Pike v. Bruce 
Church, lnc.,21 weighing the incidental burdens of the statute on inter-
state commerce against the statute's local benefits.22 
According to the court, Washington's statute protected three local 
groups: internet service providers (ISPs),23 owners of allegedly spoofed 
domain names, and email users.24 The court concluded that a mass of 
deceptive spam messages could clog the ISPs' servers, reducing the 
quality of service for other customers. 25 Disgruntled recipients may 
respond to deceptively packaged spam messages,26 deluging the hap-
less owner of the misappropriated domain name with thousands of 
messages.27 Finally, deceptive spam inconveniences recipients.28 
Having concluded that the law protected legitimate local interests, 
the court next analyzed the burdens imposed on interstate commerce. 
According to the court, "the only burden the Act places on spammers 
is the requirement of truthfulness, a requirement that does not burden 
commerce but actually facilitates it by eliminating fraud and decep-
tion."29 The court went on to fault the lower court for looking to the 
costs that the act imposed on noncompliance, rather than to the costs 
imposed by compliance with the statute:30 "This focus on the burden 
2! 397 u.s. 137 (1970). 
22 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409. Pike held that "[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effec-
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, 
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits." Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
23 An ISP allows individuals to connect to the Internet and receive email messages. The ISP 
has special computers, known as "servers," which are connected to the network of communication 
lines that make up the Internet. Individuals can then use their personal computers to connect to 
these servers and, via the servers, to the Internet as a whole. In addition, the servers often pro-
vide space to store email messages until patrons can download them to their personal computers. 
24 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409. 
25 I d. In addition, the court noted that "[ o ]perational costs ... increase as ISPs hire more cus-
tomer service representatives to field spam complaints and more system administrators to detect 
accounts being used to send spam." I d. at 410. 
26 Each email address contains a domain name indicating where the message originated. 
Thus, the email address "lhand@lawreview.org" has the domain name "lawreview.org," showing 
that this email account is housed on the law review computer server. It is possible electronically 
to alter the apparent domain name of an email address so that a message originating from one 
computer appears to be coming from a different computer. The Washington Jaw forbids this 
practice. See WASH. REV. CODE § I9,190.020(1)(a) (1999). 
27 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 410 (relating the story of a domain owner whose computer was shut 
down for three days by replies to deceptive spam). 
28 ld. 
29 I d. at 411 (citations omitted). 
JO ld. By "noncompliance" the court referred to the costs of continuing to send legal but de-
ceptive spam to non-Washington residents, which necessitates the difficult task of identifying 
which email addresses belong to Washington residents. See id. Note that this is not really non-
compliance because sending deceptive email messages to non-Washington residents does not vio-
late the Washington statute. By "compliance" the court meant sending only nondeceptive spam 
messages to both Washington and non-Washington residents. See id. This is really overcompli-
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of noncompliance is contrary to the approach taken in the Pike bal-
ancing test, where the United States Supreme Court assessed the cost 
of compliance with the challenged statute."31 The court rejected 
Heckel's claim that because other states had slightly different anti-
spamming provisions, Washington was subjecting him to inconsistent 
and contradictory laws, noting that "the inquiry under the dormant 
commerce clause is not whether the states have enacted different anti-
spam statutes but whether those differences create compliance costs 
that are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."32 
In Heckel, the court neglected the difficult issues posed by the 
Washington anti-spamming law by failing to recognize the full costs 
imposed by the statute. The court's conclusory characterization of 
Heckel's activities as "deceptive" and "fraudulent" masked deeper 
complexity concerning spam and the dormant commerce clause. The 
difficulty of the "weighing" required by current doctrine33 makes it all 
the more important for courts to adopt a coherent framework within 
which to carry out their analysis. The Heckel court drew on recent 
scholarship to adopt such a framework but ultimately failed to appre-
ciate the full contours of the problem posed by state Internet regula-
tions. 
In an article relied on by the Heckel court, Professors Jack L. Gold-
smith and Alan 0. Sykes offer a way of conceptualizing the Pike bal-
ancing test.34 They argue that markets oversupply activities that do 
ance, since it includes messages that conform to the statute even when the statute does not apply, 
that is, when sending messages to non-Washington residents. 
31 I d. aqu (citations omitted). 
32 I d. at 412. Heckel also claimed that the law could subject him to liability for activity occur-
ring completely outside the state of Washington. I d. He offered the hypothetical of a Washington 
resident who downloaded her email while in another state, arguing that applying the statute in 
such a case would impose liability for completely extraterritorial conduct. I d. The court avoided 
this issue by noting that "the hypothetical mistakenly presumes that the Act must be construed to 
apply to Washington residents when they are out of the state, a construction that creates a juris-
dictional question not at issue in this case." I d. 
33 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Supreme Court held in Pike that, 
"[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its 
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on 
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike, 397 U.S. at 
142. Since Pike, the Supreme Court has struggled to conceptualize what this balancing requires. 
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding a law designed to 
discourage corporate takeovers); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 45 7 U.S. 624 (1982) (striking down a law 
designed to discourage corporate takeovers). Justice Scalia has criticized Pike, noting that while 
the Court refers to its adjudication as balancing, "the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since 
the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line 
is longer than a particular rock is heavy." Benedix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 
888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
34 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
uo YALE L.]. 785 (2001); see also Heckel, 24 P.3d at 411. 
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not fully internalize their social costs. 35 Government can solve this 
problem by imposing a "tax"36 on the activity that forces those engag-
ing in it to internalize its social costs.37 When these externalities cross 
state lines, however, state governments may have an incentive to over-
regulate externality-producing behavior in other states because their 
own citizens are less likely to bear the increased costs.38 When states 
impose a "tax" that exceeds the activity's social costs there is a net loss 
to society.39 The professors claim dormant commerce clause balancing 
should be understood in terms of policing these cross-border "taxes" to 
ensure that they do not exceed the social costs of the activity they aim 
to curb.40 Their article explicitly discusses the case,41 and the Wash-
ington Supreme Court borrowed much of its argument from the arti-
cle.42 According to Goldsmith and Sykes, the Washington law imposes 
virtually no costs because "[c]ompliance with the various antispam 
statutes is easy compared to noncompliance, which requires the 
spammer to incur the costs of forging, re-mailing, and the like."43 
While the conceptual framework posed by Goldsmith and Sykes is 
promising, their neat solution is problematic for two reasons. First, its 
definition of costs is too simple. The only cost considered is the actual 
effort involved in complying with the statute; however, any realistic 
analysis must also consider the opportunity costs of foregoing all de-
ceptive email messages, not simply those prohibited by Washington 
law. This is because, given the current state of technology, it is virtu-
ally impossible to determine the geographic location of any particular 
email address.44 In the face of the Washington law, nonresident 
spammers must either comply with Washington's requirements in all 
of the spam that they send (and thus forgo legal but deceptive 
spamming of non-Washingtonians) or run the risk of being brought 
35 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 34, at 798-99. See generally ROBERT S. PINDYCK & 
DANIELL. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 624-26 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the market ineffi-
ciencies resulting from negative externalities). 
36 In this context "tax" refers to so-called Pigouvian taxes, which are not revenue raising de-
vices but rather government-imposed costs on socially costly activity. There is no reason that a 
Pigouvian tax must take the form of an actual tax. Fines, transfers (that is, tort judgments), and 
other mechanisms that impose increased costs could all serve the same function. See Goldsmith & 
Sykes, supra note 34, at 8oo. 
37 I d. at 8oo. 
38 I d. at 8o4-os. 
39 ld. 
40 ld. 
4! ld. at 793--94, 8r8-19. The article appeared after the lower court's decision, but before its 
appeal. 
42 See Heckel, 24 P.3d at 411. 
43 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 34, at 819. 
44 Some software programs and internet services purport to identify the geographic location of 
particular domain names using a variety of techniques. However, such techniques are costly and 
inaccurate at best. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 34, at 8xo-x2. 
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into Washington's courts. The Heckel court implies that these costs 
can be ignored because the lost profits result from "deception and 
fraud."45 Yet the fact that deceptive email is an unseemly way to 
make a living does not imply that one can ignore the costs of discon-
tinuing it. To do so substitutes name-calling for analysis. 
The second problem is that the Goldsmith and Sykes analysis as-
sumes that all jurisdictions share Washington's view of deceptive 
spam. Making a living off of deceptive spam imposes externalities on 
others. Yet states have long made the decision to favor businesses by 
allowing them to impose such externalities.46 Most jurisdictions in the 
United States have not adopted anti-spamming laws, and such inac-
tion may have "been none the less a choice [by those states]."47 To the 
extent that this inactivity reflects a less negative view of deceptive 
spamming,48 imposing a "tax" on such messages will result in a de-
crease in net welfare. 
The court could still have concluded that the savings to ISPs and 
email users were greater than the full costs imposed on spammers like 
Heckel. Likewise, it could have concluded that, even in the absence of 
benefits to out-of-state residents who are not adverse to deceptive 
spam, the benefits realized by Washington's spam-hating residents 
were so great as to result in a net benefit to society. While there is 
something surreal about the idea that courts have the resources to jus-
tify such empirical claims,49 these claims seem potentially reasonable 
in light of common experience. 
45 See Heckel, 24 P.Jd at 819. The deceptive messages are not fraudulent in any meaningful 
legal sense. The purpose of deceptive spam is to advertise a product. Ultimately, Heckel's profits 
came from voluntary and fully informed transactions. His deceptive messages simply tricked 
people into opening them, thus defrauding people out of at most a few seconds of their time. Cf 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 221, 310 (1965) (discussing tortious frauds). Any costs 
his activity imposed on ISPs would be legally conceptualized as a nuisance or perhaps as a tres-
pass. Cf eBay v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d ross, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (suggesting 
that online behavior that threatened to crash a computer server constituted trespass to chattels). 
46 Cf MORTON}. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 178o-186o, at 
63-108 (1977) (arguing that nineteenth-century courts provided wholesale subsidies to nascent 
industries by allowing them to externalize costs through loosened tort rules). For example, some 
jurisdictions forbid soliciting people in their cars because it inconveniences drivers and imposes 
on their privacy. Other jurisdictions allow such business techniques. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 
316.2055 (2001) (prohibiting the throwing of advertising material into any motor vehicle on a pub-
lic roadway). 
47 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (suggesting that state inaction may be the result 
of a political or policy choice). 
48 Admittedly, this may be a less than realistic assumption. On the other hand, the alternative 
is for courts to divine what the people of another jurisdiction "really" think about a given issue. 
Given this alternative, the assumption - however unrealistic in particular cases - seems justi-
fied. 
49 Cf Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Tho-
mas, ]., dissenting) (arguing that "the morass of our negative Commerce Clause case law only 
serves to highlight the need to abandon that failed jurisprudence"). Justices on both ends of the 
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However, reaching the "right" result in this case does not excuse the 
flaws in the court's reasoning. The Heckel court's approach to the 
Pike test is dangerous because it avoids weighing the costs of poten-
tially unconstitutional legislation by simply attaching a negative label 
to a burdened ~ctivity. Far from providing the kind of efficiency 
promised by the Goldsmith and Sykes economic model of the dormant 
commerce clause, such analysis would potentially allow states to avoid 
proper scrutiny for their laws. Other courts grappling with state Inter-
net regulations and the dormant commerce clause would do well to 
engage in a more complete consideration of costs, rather than using pe-
jorative labels as a conceptual shortcut. 
ideological spectrum have expressed doubt about the ability of the Court to answer the questions 
posed by the Pike test. Justice Scalia has suggested that "[ w ]bile it bas become standard practice 
... to consider ... whether the burden on commerce imposed by a state statute 'is clearly exces-
sive in relation to .the putative local benefits,' such an inquiry is ill suited to the judicial function 
and should be undertaken rarely if at all." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970)). Writing in the same vein, Justice Stevens bas argued that "speculation about ... real 
world economic effects ... is beyond our institutional competence." Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 
519 U.S. 278, 315 (1997) (Stevens,]., dissenting). Looking at the complex empirical questions in-
volved in a proper analysis of the costs and benefits of the Jaw at issue in Heckel, the position of 
these jurists has a great deal of appeal. Indeed, Goldsmith and Sykes express skepticism on this 
point, arguing that "there is a growing consensus that courts ... are ill-suited to make the many 
difficult value judgments that the balancing test requires .... These concerns have particular va-
lence in the Internet context ... [where] courts have failed properly to identify and weigh the 
costs and benefits of state Internet regulations." Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 34, at 820. 
